Gonzalo Otalora has written a book entitled ¡Feo! (Ugly!), which calls for the taxation of good-looking people to counteract the natural advantages they have over munters. "Countless studies show that ... it's easier for them to find jobs; they're paid more and find partners more easily," he says. The "manifiesto del feosexual" also calls for the levy to be donated to the ugly, and for photo requirements on job applications and airbrushing in magazines to be outlawed.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
A Pretty Tax?
Is this sufficiently Rawlsian?
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3 comments:
I'm not so sure that Rawls would require it unless we think that physical attractiveness is important to any conception of the good. That is to say, maybe it's not a primary good.
Now, Sen and Nussbaum, that's a different case.
I think the requirement of a "pretty tax" is patently absurd both within and outside a Rawlsian framework. Any justification of a "pretty tax" would have to be under the difference principle; I cannot imagine that it furthers any conception of any liberties.
Considered in the narrow sense, a "pretty tax" may seem plausible. In order to maximize the minimum possibility (those who end up poor and ugly), we need to redistribute between the pretty and the ugly given this relationship. It is important to remember, however, that Rawls' principles of justice apply only to background institutions and not to particular instances. Thus, it would be sufficient to show not only (as it appears Otalora has) that ugly people are worse off.
Rather, it is necessary to show that this tax would improve the lot of the worst off in society. This is far from clear (as I suppose is generally the case when applying Rawls' theory of justice) but in fact the opposite seems would be true. The tax would necessitate a whole bureaucracy or industry to rank individuals by basis of "prettiness" and determine the magnitude of their "pretty tax" or "ugly compensation" given their deviation from the societal average (or some other scheme). This would take a good amount of society's resources (intelligent workers, buildings, etc.). The resulting inefficiency would bring down the standard of living of all of society over time. Furthermore, the ugly people in society are not necessarily the worst off (being worse off on average does not mean that they are the worst off group). Otalora would thus have to make the claim that the loss in efficiency as a result of this diversion of resources would be more than offset by the increase in self-esteem of the uglies. To put it mildly, this seems unlikely. This is assuming that there are no direct negative repercussions of the tax. Naming just two examples, this could include resentment of the pretty or a culture of inadequacy within the ugly. Therefore, I don't see how Otalora could justify his tax on Rawlsian grounds.
The case of Sen also seems to fail. Otalora would have to make the case that this tax would further freedom, the ability "to choose a life one has reason to value", of individuals in society. A person's capability is the set of things that a person may value doing or being that they could feasibly achieve. Otalora would have to make the argument that the ugly people need this redistribution in order to be able to choose the life that they have reason to value. However, this doesn't seem to be the case. It would perhaps help the well-being of the poor ugly citizen but all other things constant, does that person have reason to value this better life? The logic that allows this reason allows reason for redistribution based upon intelligence and other individual characteristics. Since prettiness is both a function of genetics and environmental conditioning (such as working out), that is to say that their is reason for redistribution based upon all individual characteristics. The result is pure egalitarianism. I don't see how one that is possible or two that is desirable.
I will not comment on Nussbaum because I haven't finished reading her. Also, I think that this tax fails in general on the face of it.
I agree that the idea is ridiculous on its face. I wasn't trying to say that Sen and Nussbaum would have to support it, just that they can't use the "not a primary good" reason Rawls has available to him.
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